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Abstract In this paper an overview of the first results of
FP7 CIPRNet project is presented. Particularly, we
demonstrate CIPRNet services for critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) stakeholders. The role of the proposed
services is to support decisions in the CIP domain. More-
over, those services are expected to serve as the under-
pinnings for the European Infrastructures Simulation and
Analysis Centre (EISAC) which, similarly to the US
NISAC, should provide operational services on CIP, for the
benefits of CI operators, stakeholders and the Public
Authorities committed to CIP.
Keywords Critical infrastructure protection  CIPRNet
project  Decision support  Services  Modelling and
simulation
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures (CI) protection (CIP) is a complex
and delicate task. From one hand, decisions taken for CIP
purposes may impact human lives and material goods,
threatened by both natural phenomena as well as the con-
sequences of human errors. From the other hand, such
decisions must be taken in real-time—particularly during
the CI-related crisis (European Council 2008). Most often
such decisions are taken by analysing a large amount of
heterogeneous data.
In CIP domain, this challenge can be presented in three
dimensions, called 3 V model of Big Data problem
(Gartner Inc. 2011). These three dimensions include:
• Volume of data, that must be processed to build an
actual picture of operation needed to take the appro-
priate decision in given time;
• Velocity of the constantly changing data provided to
the decision maker from various sources, and;
• Variety of data that come from heterogeneous sources,
challenging the reasoning and information correlation.
In this paper, the services for CIP community and
decision makers are presented to support decision-making
process in CIP, both in the preparedness (‘‘cold’’) phase, as
well as in the crisis (‘‘hot’’) phase.
The goal of such services development is to increase the
situational awareness of decision makers by extraction of
the most necessary information from the large amount of
heterogeneous data coming from different sources (such as
real-time sensorial data).
Specification and development of the services proposed
in this paper are the objectives of the Critical Infrastructure
Preparedness and Resilience Research Network (CIPRNet)
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European Commission’s 7th Research Framework Program
(FP7) (CIPRNet 2015).
In the first phase of the project, the end-users commu-
nity was asked to express and share their needs and
expectations related to increase effectiveness of modelling,
simulation and CIP-related analysis environment and
decision making process.
In this paper, the analysis of their requirements is pro-
vided as well as the description of the demanded services
that will later be designed in the CIPRNet project.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
• Section 2 presents the CIPRNet project,
• Section 3 focuses on end-users views and needs that
contributed to the specification of CIPRNet services,
• Sections 4 and 5 present CIPRNet DSS services and
CIPRNet VCCC services, respectively,
• Section 6 discusses non-technical aspects of CIPRNet
services,
• Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 CIPRNet project
The Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience
Research Network or CIPRNet (CIPRNet 2015) establishes a
Network of Excellence in CIP. CIPRNet performs research
and development addressing a wide range of stakeholders
including (multi)national emergency management, critical
infrastructure operators, policy makers, and public authori-
ties. By integrating resources of the CIPRNet partners
acquired in more than 60 EU co-funded research projects,
CIPRNet is going to create new advanced capabilities for its
stakeholders. A key technology for the new capabilities will
be modelling, simulation and analysis for CIP. In order to
achieve its mission, CIPRNet’s Joint Programme of Activi-
ties has four major threads:
• Providing new capabilities to end users for better
preparedness for CI-related emergencies:
• An advanced decision support system enabling the
prediction of risk on CI based on consequence
analysis,
• ‘What if’—analysis for exploring different courses
of action,
• Support of secure design of next generation
infrastructures,
• ‘Ask the expert’ service for demonstrating timely,
actionable, risk-informed CIP analyses and strate-
gies for authorities,
• Building required capacities by educating and training
experts and researchers (reaching a critical mass),
• Providing knowledge and technology to end users for
improving their understanding of the role of CI in crises
and emergencies: simulators, middleware, models,
• Providing long-lasting end-user support by establishing
a Virtual Centre of Competence and Expertise in CIP
(VCCC).
The project started on March 2013 and will be com-
pleted on February 2017.1
3 CIP end-user views collection
One of the first tasks performed by the CIPRNet consor-
tium was to identify the needs arising from CIP commu-
nities, by a direct interaction with end-users and domains’
stakeholders. The identified stakeholders relevant to the
project represented the public, private, research and aca-
demia domains. The methods for gathering user views in
the CIPRNet project were face-to-face meetings, remote
user interviews and the CIPRNet questionnaire, filled in by
the project end-users and domain experts. Outcomes of the
collected questionnaires were a starting point in require-
ments specification process towards specification of solu-
tions described in this paper.
The questionnaire was designed in order to provide a
broad view on current end-user problems, limitations and
expectations, including big data issues. Most of the ques-
tions were presented in an open or semi-open format.
Therefore, respondents were neither limited in expression
of their opinions, nor biased by pre-defined options to
choose.
Generally, the questionnaire has been divided into four
blocks of questions, namely:
• General information about the respondents, particularly
their organisations, range of activities, matter in which
he/she acts,
• Questions related to accessing the information, partic-
ularly concerning availability of information about CI
coming from private and public sectors and used during
CI-related crisis,
• Questions about using decision support systems during
respondent duties, providing information about deci-
sion support mechanisms and tools, their limitations,
data exchange, standards, etc.,
• Questions about simulation and modelling for CI crisis
management purposes.
Respondents, who filled in the questionnaire, represent
various organisations—from local and regional CI-related
organisations to Pan-European agencies, and from
1 More information about the CIPRNet project can be found at
project website: www.ciprnet.eu.
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academic and applied researchers to CI-operators. How-
ever, the majority of respondents are representatives of
organisations that operate within nationwide range, and
usually as public emergency/crisis management centre.
3.1 Accessing the information
The respondents assessed availability of various informa-
tion related to CI from various sectors and sources and
gave them ratings. According to respondents’ ratings,
generally there are no significant differences between
levels of availability of information, when comparing
public and private sectors. The average ratings for public
vs. private CI information availability (e.g. geo-localisation
data, operational data and sensitive data about these
infrastructures) are at the similar level. Considering infor-
mation about CI dependences, it is noticeable that such
information during normal operation is significantly easier
accessible than during non-normal state of operation.
The questionnaire analysis shows that the hardest cate-
gories of information to be accessed include:
• Operational data of private sector CI,
• Information about CI across the national/regional
borders,
• Information about CI across public–private sector
borders,
• Information about CI dependencies during non-normal
operation.
In addition, respondents indicated that reliable data of
CI financial aspects and CI failure status are also not easy
to obtain from CI management entities.
According to end-users,
• Climatic and weather information for specific (emer-
gency) area, and
• Geo-location information about public/private sector
CI,
are described as the relatively easiest to obtain.
Concluding, most of the categories (excluding e.g.
mentioned climatic/weather data) of information consid-
ered in the questionnaire were assessed as relatively hard to
obtain. This observation indicates a serious problem related
to information accessibility, and what is worth noticing,
challenges related to acquisition of necessary information
exist regardless of the CI functioning sector (i.e., private
versus public).
3.2 Decision support systems
About 40 % of respondents reported that they do not use
any ICT-based support for their decisions. The majority of
remaining 60 % of respondents stated that they (or their
organisations) use internally developed tools for specific
purposes of their organisation, or alternatively, that they
use various loosely coupled data sources (such as GIS
resources, the weather data, etc.) to support decisions.
Specific DSS tools used by interviewees have been listed,
such as C3 M, IPCR or WebEOC. These systems are
exploited for the crisis response planning, reporting, pro-
cedure and policy creating, resource allocation and
tracking.
When asked about the analytical capabilities, as well as
about usefulness and effectiveness of these systems during
crisis-related decision-making, respondents presented dif-
ferent views. About half of them admitted that the used
(DSS) systems do not meet their needs and that these
systems are not tailored to the specific needs of their
operation. As respondents emphasised, the main weakness
of these systems is the need for advanced customisation
(costly in terms of time, efforts, financing, etc.).
Other drawbacks include:
• Lack of interconnectivity with the other systems (e.g.
used by entities cooperating with stakeholder’s organ-
isation during CI-related crisis),
• Lack of possibility to integrate the data from other
entities/systems, hampering the cooperation between
various organisations,
• Limited capabilities of spatial visualisation of threats,
and
• Lack of capabilities to support comparison of the
current situation to earlier forecasts.
Cross-border decision-making is another open gap of the
used systems, impacting end-user operation.
The CIPRNet interviewees listed also various kinds of
information sources that are used for building situational
awareness in the emergency response efforts. These include
mainly external sources such as cooperating entities and
agencies involved in emergency response, which provide
hydrological data, weather forecasts and information about CI
(including geo-location). Other sources of information are the
direct reports from the field/emergency area. Usually, such
information is not publicly available. However, end-users can
access that information in real-time or near real-time.
3.3 ‘‘What-if’’, consequence and CI dependencies
analyses
Respondents stated that the primary need for simulation
models relates to consequences of CI object failure,
employing e.g. cascade models of infrastructure failures.
End-users indicated different scales of such consequences,
varying from impact on another single system, up to con-
sequences for national security, societal impact, national
economy, etc.
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Moreover, respondents noticed lack of models support-
ing estimation of CI restoration time, identification of
critical nodes (supporting CI objects prioritisation) and
simulation models relevant to a given, specific sector (e.g.
applicable for health care services during CI failure).
Asked for what should be improved in relation to
decision-support for emergency management, respondents
identified four main areas of interests:
1. Simulation and modelling, in particular development
of threat modelling and forecasting tools, e.g. for
simulation of the consequences of possible decisions.
2. Estimation of crisis impact, both on low level (e.g.
impact of CI object failure on e.g. hospital function-
ing), as well on higher level—for example estimation
of CI failure costs including national economy losses.
3. Emergency communication, namely: (a) informa-
tion/data sharing, (b) timeliness of received informa-
tion, (c) exchange of information among cooperating
agencies and organisations in real-time, (d) compati-
bility of data formats and (e) mechanisms to support
informing about hazards, etc.
4. Cooperation and training between solution providers
and emergency management teams. According to the
respondents, closer public–private cooperation also
could improve the current situation in decision-mak-
ing. The respondents also indicated problems related to
the current assessment of CI dependencies. The most
significant examples include:
• Limited capabilities of simulations, particularly in
terms of simulating interrelations between various
CI and analysing the threats based on such
relationships.
• Organisations’ and CI operators’ isolation. In other
words, organisations often do not effectively take
into account consequences of their infrastructure
failures, exceeding beyond their organisations and
impacting other sectors, companies, etc.
• Lack of systematic planning of CI protection and
restoration after a crisis, as well as lack of
procedures supporting such protection.
• Problems with identification of contact points that
in a case of crisis should be immediately available
for responsible entities.
• International standardisation in the CIP area.
• Information accessibility.
• Data validation and reliability.
3.4 Key findings related to user requirements
The end-users needs, expectations and requirements (pre-
sented in previous subsection) can be categorised into the
following aspects related to the decision support process,
simulation and modelling and access to the real-time data
and critical information.
The key findings that have been identified after the
analysis of the mentioned aspects are as follows:
• The end-users expect more advanced, customised and
tailored (to their needs) decision support solutions,
which will allow for flexible spatial threats visualisa-
tion, easy integration with new data sources or other
systems, and information sharing between different
entities engaged into a crisis management process.
• The end-users lack accurate models and simulation
tools allowing for consequences, impact and risk
analysis of CI failures and cascading effects. The
forecasting capabilities are emphasised as one of the
most desired.
• The end-users articulated the need of access to
information related to CI from various sectors. They
emphasised difficulties in gaining data related to
operational state of private sectors CI and CI-related
information across public–public and national-regional
borders.
The requirements identified in the survey were the basis
for the development activities in CIPRNet WP7 (‘‘Decision
Support System with consequence analysis’’). More pre-
cisely, they were used as guidelines for further work, such
as the final system specification and particular the CIPRNet
DSS components development. Moreover, the survey
results also influenced the work in WP6, complementing
the description of the requirements for a cross-sector sim-
ulation environment and adding the end-user perspective
into the development of application scenarios and the
realisation of a demonstrator.
However, it should be mentioned that CIPRNet general
requirements were focused on the decision support front-
end, rather than on the back-end (the back-end consists of
the models and simulations that provide the input infor-
mation for the CIPRNet DSS).
4 CIPRNet DSS services specification
In order to cover the key findings (described in the previous
section) coming from the end-user perspective analysis, the
following DSS services have been specified: consequences
analysis, threat forecasting (TF), threat visualisation, data
accessing and gathering. It is expected that the function-
alities and the number of services provided by DSS will
evolve over the time. The proposed DSS will have two
distinctive operational modes, namely ‘‘Hot Phase’’ and
‘‘Cold Phase’’ decision support (Fig. 1).
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The ‘‘Cold Phase’’ is computationally intensive and
therefore it is dedicated to post-mortem analysis and crit-
ical infrastructures operators training purposes. Among
others it will heavily rely on historical data, modelling and
simulation analysis (MS&A). The ‘‘Hot Phase’’ includes
continuous and real-time risk assessment, threat forecasting
and consequences analysis, which is being conducted using
real-time data during the real crisis. These aspects are
explained in next sections.
4.1 Data accessing and gathering (DAG)
This service provides the DSS with data needed to run the
CIPRNet DSS workflow and with all information useful to
mitigate and manage a crisis/emergency due to CI failures.
In particular, the DSS-DAG service feeds data to the DSS-
TF service that has the aim to forecast the possible natural
phenomena that, potentially, can produce physical damage
to CI components in a given area.
The DSS-DAG service will allow gathering and storing
DSS relevant data to the CIPRNet DB (CIPRNet database).
The data stored within the CIPRNet DB belongs, in gen-
eral, to different pre-defined layers:
• Territorial layer,
• Socio-economical layer,
• Technological infrastructure layer,
• Historical events layer.
Each layer can be divided into sub layers. For example,
the historical events layer can be further divided into
geological (e.g. earthquakes), geomorphological (e.g.
landslides), hydro-meteorological (e.g. floods) historical
events layer.
Data sources can be governmental repositories (e.g. the
national GIS repositories as the Italian SINANET site, the
Italian National Institute of Statistics—ISTAT), CI opera-
tors, data coming from simulation models such as the
weather forecast data that needs to be logged in order to
allow different kinds of offline analysis (e.g. statistical
analysis).
In general, data stored within the CIPRNet DB will
require a different frequency of update operations. For
example, the number of people living in a specific area
needs to be updated once a year, while the historical events
layer data (e.g. the earthquakes events in a specific area)
needs to be updated with a frequency of minutes or hours.
The update procedure is performed by using different
modalities depending on data availability and update fre-
quency requirements. In some cases, the data updating
operations will depend on authorised data scraping auto-
mated procedures. The CIPRNet DB stores available his-
torical data (e.g. rain precipitation data) and allows the
development and the maintenance of historical series of
data. The CIPRNet DSS can also use external repositories
(e.g. via GIS WMS protocols).
4.2 Threat forecasting (TF)
This service provides the DSS with the capability to fore-
cast natural events that have the potential to harm CI
components (e.g. heavy rain, flooding, landslide, drought,
heat wave, etc.).
The capability to predict a possible natural phenomenon
that, potentially, can produce physical damage to the CI
components in a given area is one of the key features of the
DSS. The DSS-TF is composed of different modules, each
dedicated to a specific source of perturbation to be moni-
tored. In particular, the DSS-TF through the data accessing
and gathering services will acquire different kinds of data:
weather forecast data, now-casting data, earth observation
data. Each module will use this data to run specific models
to forecast specific threats on a specific area. For instance,
the Flooding module will acquire data that can be used to
forecast flooding events in a given area (e.g. abundant and
prolonged precipitation, pluviometric monitoring sensor
networks) followed by the run of hydrologic and/or
hydraulic models to predict the flooding dynamics. The
plug-and-play and easy to extend architecture of the DSS
will allow connecting the CIPRNET DSS modules, which
will be implemented to provide specific threat forecasting
capabilities for specific areas. Indeed, the DSS-TF service
can be configured in order to rely on already available data
and models. For example, an instance of the DSS-TF
Flooding module for the city of Rome can be configured to
include the available data, which is related to the moni-
toring sensor network owned by the Autorita` di bacino del
Fiume Tevere (Tiber Basin Authority). The main modules
to be included in the DSS-TF service are e.g.: flooding,
lightening, landslide, strong wind, heavy snow, heavy rain,
cold wave, heat wave, etc.
Fig. 1 Operational modes of the CIPRNet DSS
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For each CI component, the DSS-TF service will pro-
duce a threat strength matrix that represents the probability
that the given threats will materialise in a given area with
a specific strength. Table 1 is an example of a threat
strength matrix for a given CI component. The rows of the
matrix represent the considered threats and the columns
the threat strength. The matrix entries indicate the proba-
bilities that the CI component will be affected by a threat
of a strength as indicated in the column value. Considering
the example presented in Table 1, the DSS-TF service
indicates that the specific CI component will be impacted
by a flooding event of strength 4 and by strong wind of
strength 3.
The threat prediction matrix will be ‘‘cross-checked’’
with the vulnerability matrix (which is a characteristic
matrix of each CI element) representing the specific vul-
nerability threshold of the each CI element with respect to
each ‘‘predictable’’ event (i.e. each event which could be
predicted together with its strength, as in the threat strength
matrix). In this respect, the vulnerability matrix has the
same entries (in the rows and in the columns) of the threat
matrix: differently from the former, it contains the
threshold for the resistance of the CI elements to the dif-
ferent perturbation sources. For example, let’s suppose that
the vulnerability matrix for the transformer TR1 indicates
that the element is vulnerable to flooding of strength 4. If
the threat strength predicted for the area where TR1 stands
is as that reported in Table 1, this will indicate that the TR1
element will be likely to be damaged by the flooding and in
the subsequent flow of computation, the DSS will predict
the TR1 element in fault (when the predicted threat will
manifest) and further evaluate Impacts on services and
Consequences on different Sectors.
Figure 2 shows the main components of the DSS
architecture that realise the DSS-TF.
The data accessing service, a component of the data
accessing and gathering service, acquires data from exter-
nal sources. This data is acquired and stored within the
CIPRNet DB and is being employed by the different threat
prediction modules to forecast the threats and to build, for
each CI component, the threat strength matrix. The DSS-
TF realises a specific workflow for the earthquake case.
Indeed, the earthquake events are monitored by the DSS
through the acquisition of raw data from seismic sensor
networks and/or the reported measured shake maps. This
data (e.g. earthquake epicentre and magnitude, ground
tangential acceleration and the macro-seismic intensity) is
being employed by the earthquake processing data module
Table 1 Threat strength matrix
Threat level 1 2 3 4 5
Earthquake (ground acceleration) 0 0 0 0 0
Strong wind 0 0 1 0 0
Lightening 0 0 0 0 0
Heavy snowfall 0 0 0 0 0
Ice 0 0 0 0 0
Landslide 0 0 0 0 0
Flash flood 0 0 0 0 0
Flooding 0 0 0 1 0
Mud flows 0 0 0 0 0
Debris avalanches 0 0 0 0 0
Heavy rain 0 0 0 0 0
Strom surge 0 0 0 0 0
… 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 2 DSS threat forecasting
architecture
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to compute detailed shake-maps. Those will be used to
assess the impact of an earthquake event.
The input to the DSS-TF service includes different
sources, namely: meteorological data (including weather
forecast data and now-casting data), sensor networks data,
earth observation data, and historical data (including
landslide data and lightening data).
4.3 Threat visualisation (TV)
Visualisation is one of the key functionalities of the DSS.
This section introduces the key functionalities that a visu-
alisation service should provide in order to fulfil the
CIPRNet end-user requirements.
The role of the service is to use different means to
visualise a wide variety of aspects related to the decision
support process, such as:
• Consequences analysis (e.g. consequence of impact on
CI or its components).
• Threat forecasting (e.g. prediction of natural disasters
like flood which may impose threats to CI).
• Risk assessment (e.g. with respect to the CIPRNet
project consequences criteria).
• Analysis of emergency situations/scenarios, and assess-
ment of how such scenarios may evolve, including the
visualisation of possible courses of actions.
• Assessment of how big is the geographical area that has
been impacted by the natural hazard.
• Prediction of possible effects of the natural hazards
(e.g. using cross-referenced layers of geographical
regions combining spatial information about the CI
and natural hazards).
• Identification of the factors that may have influence on
further development of the crisis scenario (changing
weather conditions, probable threats coming from
objects or CI located in impacted area).
The key element in the architecture of the DSS for
emergency management is the GIS. Therefore, the DSS-TV
should incorporate this visualisation technique in order to
communicate wide variety of decision support aspects.
Particularly, such visualisation must provide:
• An efficient and flexible way to access the threat
visualisation data (e.g. web-based through web-browser
or desktop GIS clients). An example of web-browser
GUI is shown in Fig. 3.
• The ability to handle multiple simultaneous requests for
visualisation (e.g. centralised web-based repository that is
able to handle multiple read/write concurrent connections).
• The ability to share the provided visualisations among
private and public stakeholders, emergency managers
and common citizens involved in the disaster response.
Figure 3 shows the Database layers widget on the left.
The represented GIS map visualizes all historical earth-
quakes in the considered area with an appropriate colour/
shape code allowing to represent both magnitude and depth
of the quake.
Figure 4 illustrates the use of GIS visualization in CIP
context. Figure 4 (left) shows a flooded area while the right
part of the Fig. 4 shows the extent and the position of roads
which have been impacted by the event (as resulting from
DSS Impact analysis). The colour code used for roads
allows to indicate the minor (green) and the higher (red)
impacts on them.
In Fig. 5, the map of the flooded area has been addi-
tionally enriched with the contextualization of the elements
of electrical infrastructure (such as electrical transformers,
high-voltage power lines, etc.) present in the flooded area.
The estimate of the physical damages inflicted to the CI
elements allows the DSS to design a ‘‘crisis scenario’’
whose simulation allows to predict the Impacts caused by
the hazard to the Service level of the wounded CI and to
the others which are functionally connected to it.
The general deployment diagram is shown in the
Fig. 6. The visualisation service will expose a typical
web-based client–server architecture. The client will
communicate with the web server over the HTTP(S) pro-
tocol. The visualisation will strongly depend on WebGIS
(responsible for spatial data manipulation) module and
CIPRNet DB.
4.4 Consequence analysis and ‘‘what-if’’ analysis
Consequence analysis is a service included in CIPRNet
DSS, that offers the added value to the decision making
process. This service enables decision-makers and oper-
ators to perceive the possible extent of the impacts
(produced by the physical damages) on the service
granted by the interested CI. Consequences are measured





• management of primary services
These are the most relevant sectors which are prone to
be hit by infrastructures services losses. Electrical outages
could produce serious threat to old-aged population, ser-
vice reduction to hospitals, unavailability of schools,
reduction of public transportation functionality etc. Con-
sequence analysis thus attempts to estimate those conse-
quences, the extents of which are measured according to
specific metrics. They will thus allow decision makers to
have a complete ‘‘perception’’ of the crisis whose extent
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can be evaluated in terms of ‘‘lives in danger’’, economical
losses (for the industrial sectors), level of functioning of
primary services (schools, hospitals, public transportations
etc.).
‘‘What-if analysis’’ (WIA) is one of the CIPRNet ser-
vices that main goal is to provide the end-user with the
simulation capabilities, which allow CI-related aspects to
be investigated. Among others, the ‘‘What-if’’ will provide
Fig. 3 Example of web-based DSS GUI
Fig. 4 Examples of different layers. Left-hand side image indicates the flooded area (blue region). The right-hand side image shows the
transportation infrastructure that has been impacted by flood (red colour) (colour figure online)
790 R. Kozik et al.
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the end-user with tools, which will allow them to analyse
different crisis scenarios that may affect critical infras-
tructures. The analysis will allow the end-user to investi-
gate different courses of actions and to evaluate their
consequences. The core functionalities of this service will
be enabled with tools and frameworks for federated sim-
ulation (Rome et al. 2009). The underpinnings for this have
been established by DIESIS (Usov et al. 2010; Masucci
et al. 2009) project, which CIPRNet is successor of.
The new capability of ‘‘what if’’ analysis will consist of
a complex backend system setup including a distributed
federated simulation, database components, and additional
modules like consequence analysis. A full deployment of
the new capability as stand-alone web application seems
currently not advisable, since the usage of the capability
requires end-user training and modelling support. There-
fore, the VCCC portal shall provide an interactive ‘‘what
if’’ analysis mock-up for demonstrating the functional
principle of CIPRNet’s ‘‘what if’’ analysis capability. The
interface of the mock-up needs to be simple and intuitive,
so that no special training for its use is required.
The expected users of this service include the manage-
ment level of public authorities and CI stakeholders. The
effects of using this service can be twofold:
• Dissemination of knowledge and added-value of
CIPRNet’s WIA capability,
• Attracting end-users to CIPRNet’s training events on
the real WIA system.
5 VCCC (Virtual centre of competence
and expertise in CIP) services specification
Virtual centre of competence and expertise in CIP is a
comprehensive repository of the tools, the technologies
and the data developed and collected in CIPRNet (and in
the previous CIP projects). During the course of CIPR-
Net, the consortium will elaborate, describe and defined
(also at the Business level) the transformation of the
VCCC into a new EU-wide asset, the European Infras-
tructures Simulation and Analysis Centre (EISAC)
which, similarly to the US NISAC, should provide (at
national scales, through national EISAC implementations,
and on a pan-European scale, through the interaction of
the national chapters) operational services on CIP, for
the benefits of CI operators and stakeholders and the
Public Authorities committed to CIP and to granting
primary services continuity.
5.1 ‘‘Ask the expert’’ service
5.1.1 Description
The ‘‘Ask the Expert’’ service will be a component of the
CIPRNet VCCC portal and will be accessible via the
VCCC. End-users will submit questions and requests for
information from the CIP domains. Questions can be
related (however, not limited) to technical CIP-related
issues, CI management, crisis management for CI, CI-re-
lated documentation, e.g. national and EU regulations,
policies, public reports and statistical data and practical
aspects of CI functioning.
The expected users of this service include public
authorities, CI stakeholders (operators, administrators),
SMEs, research and academia and society. The effects of
using this service can be two-fold. If the question is per-
tinent with the CIPRNet aims and scope, end-users will
receive a short answer by the CIPRNet expert and/or links
to publicly available sources (if this is justifiable in the
context of a given question). For more complex questions,
the requesting user will be put in contact with the most
appropriate CIPRNet expert(s), selected from the pool of
experts, based on the subject raised by the user.
Fig. 5 Example of a layer showing electrical infrastructure impacted
by flooding
Fig. 6 Visualisation service—deployment diagram
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The ‘‘Ask the Expert’’ service will incorporate a number
of procedures to guarantee possible anonymisation of the
query, to protect data and queries from being publicised (if
requested) and to ensure the secure protocols for the
authentication of the user.
The main functionalities of the service include:
• Requesting the information via a pre-formatted form
(e.g. a form with such fields as: subject, description,
domain type/name, etc.),
• Registration of request and its maintenance,
• Maintaining the database of experts providing the
knowledge for the service purposes. Such database
should contain at least the following information:
expert status (available/non-available), contact info,
domain of expertise, scope of the possible issues to be
solved,
• Filtering of requests (e.g. to reject nonsense, out of the
service scope, or too trivial requests, spam messages,
etc.),
• Queuing (including storage of waiting requests with
their status—e.g. solved, in progress, unsolvable, etc.)
and sorting the requests based on category/topic,
• Distribution of particular requests to the most appro-
priate CIPRNet experts,
• Replying to the question by the expert,
• Safe storage of (anonymised) past questions and
answers in order to:
• Control the utilisation of experts,
• Control the distribution of topics, themes and
question categories,
• Control the quality of service (e.g. issues unsolved
vs. overall number of investigated issues),
• Building the repository of the frequently asked ques-
tions (FAQs) and answers to optimise the utilisation of
expert resources (by an automatic reuse of the most
relevant answer to a given frequently asked question),
• Privacy and security functions and settings, e.g. to
define the anonymity level of a request, whether the
query/request will be publicised and available for a
wider audience, etc.
5.1.2 Input information
The main input information for this service will be the
practical and theoretical knowledge of the CIP experts that
will serve as a source of the CIP-related information and
expertise. Additionally, resources collected for the CIPedia
service (e.g. links to the CIP documents) could serve as
background resources for the ‘‘Ask the Expert’’ capability,
complementing the experts’ answers.
5.1.3 Output information
The output information during the service operation will
be:
• The experts’ answers to the particular questions,
• A list of frequent (historical) questions and answers that




CIPedia is one of the means providing the innovation of
the CIP domain by the CIPRNet project and is defined in
D8.4 document (CIPRNet 2014). The main purpose and
rationale for CIPedia is the need for common under-
standing of the CIP-related context by the multi-disci-
plinary CIP community. Each member of this community
can bring his/her view on particular CIP elements and share
it. In this sense, CIPedia will be the place in which dif-
ferent visions, definitions and points of view are mixed, in
order to develop a common understanding of the CIP-re-
lated aspects. In result, CIPedia will foster an interna-
tional collaboration of experts from the CI domain and will
improve the cross-communication and creative discussion
between them. The main assumption is that CIPedia will
be a multinational, multidisciplinary and cross-sector tool
for anyone seeking information on CI-related matters.
5.2.2 The role of the service
CIPedia is the online knowledge repository, similar to
other wiki-like services (such as the Wikipedia). CIPedia
will become one of the components of the CIPRNet’s
VCCC web portal (CIPRNet 2014).
The main characteristics of wiki-like services (thus also
CIPedia) include:
• Simplicity of content creation (using simplified mark-
up language), moderation and maintenance,
• High usefulness, easiness of navigation and content
searching,
• Openness for adding new content and improving the
existing information.
The initial content provided by the service consists of a
multi-sector and multi-disciplinary CIP glossary, devel-
oped during IRRIIS, DIESIS (Usov et al. 2010; Masucci
et al. 2009), ERNCIP (ERNCIP 2015) and CIPRNet
activities. This glossary has been converted into a wiki-like
online service, currently being evaluated and improved by
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the CIPRNet consortium. On short term, it will be made
readable to the public, and then open for write access to
registered experts.
The target for CIPedia are all groups of CI stake-
holders, including policy-makers, relevant authorities, CIP
operators and owners, manufacturers, CIP-related facilities
and laboratories, and the society. CIPedia is also a
community-building instrument. Experts in CIP and CI
sector experts shall be encouraged to register at CIPedia
and make contributions to its contents. In a longer per-
spective, CIPedia will contain also information on
European and international CIP policies, links to main
policy and regulatory documents, and more.
5.2.3 The key properties of the service
From the perspective of the CIPedia administration and
maintenance, the service will allow for:
• Verifying the newly created accounts (including secu-
rity verification, e.g. anti-botnet measures),
• Assigning the newly created accounts to the pre-defined
groups of users (e.g. administrators, moderators,
reviewers, standard users, etc.),
• Safe storage of the online identities owned by the
registered users of the service,
• Safe storage and indexing of the online content (actual
and backups of historical articles, articles discussed
before verification, etc.),
• Organising the content in various (Wikipedia-like)
categories. The specified categories (e.g. one for
glossary, another for policies, law acts, etc.) will
improve the usability of the service and improve the
effectiveness of the navigation, while using
the CIPedia.
• Verifying, reviewing and (in result) accepting or not the
user created content. Such mechanisms are necessary to
maintain the reliability and trustworthiness of informa-
tion generated by users. Other purpose of these
functionalities is the security of users which should
assure that e.g. external HTTP links placed in the
article text will not redirect them to a malicious
website,
• Tracing and logging the activities performed on
content, as well as viewing the past versions of a given
article, in order to restore it in the case of so-called
‘‘online vandalism’’.
The security-related functionalities result from the fact
that both the CIPedia and wiki services are focused on
openness and allow the broad spectrum of users (often
anonymous in terms of expertise, knowledge, intentions) to
access. Therefore, mechanisms such as access control,
verification of user-generated content and other security
measures are essential to keep order and provide the quality
of the collected content.
5.2.4 Input information
The initial contents of the CIPRNet CIPedia service
consists of the CIP glossary developed during the project
by the CIPRNet consortium. Further CI-related knowledge
shall be introduced to the repository as user-generated
content.
5.2.5 Output information
Output information are Wiki-like pages and articles,
organised in a structured manner and containing CIP-re-
lated knowledge and information.
6 Non-technical aspects of CIPRNet DSS services
There are a number of non-technical aspects that have to be
taken into account when developing the CIPRNet DSS and
before its services are launched. They concern the legal,
organisational and long-term customer support issues.
The analysis of these aspects has been divided into two
groups. Firstly, the aspects related to some specific con-
ditions under which services will be deployed during the
runtime of CIPRNet are described. Afterwards, general
requirements for future EISAC services are provided.
During the CIPRNet project the aspects related to the
legal, organisational and customer support will be addres-
sed differently in contrast to typical commercial solutions
aiming at business continuity, growth, and ravenous. It
must be emphasised that CIPRNet is a research project and
as such it may follow different (non-commercial) regula-
tions and limitations when it comes to licences related to
data sources (e.g. geospatial data), software components
(e.g. libraries and software frameworks), and third party
external services (e.g. Google maps). Typically, these
licences allow the researches to use mentioned before
resources freely without being charged. However, as far as
access to data is concerned, the CIPRNet consortium will
not offer/allow for access to any raw/input data we use,
only aggregated data or the results will be provided. The
handling of data is guided by CIPRNet’s Ethics Guidelines.
When it comes to the organisational and customer support,
during the project CIPRNet lifetime, all aspects related to
services maintenance, bug-fixing, and responsibilities
management will be handled by organisations developing
certain services or its components. It must be also men-
tioned that all services, being part of a CIPRNet proof of
concept, shall clearly define terms of use. Therefore, the
end-users must be appropriately acknowledged that they
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use the services on their own risk without any warranty and
their authors will not be liable for any damages arising
from their use.
These aspects are related, in the first place, to some
formal arrangements as regards the functioning of
EISAC—what legal form it will take (of a company, non-
profit organisation, association) and to the final form the
DSS will take.
Establishing EISAC as a legal entity involves taking into
account different legal aspects, as e.g. the intellectual
property, liability, licensing, data collection, administrative
legal overhead, sharing and protection and flexibility. The
intellectual property protection may refer to EISAC as a
legal entity and would thus, e.g. involve the protection of
the name (trademark) that will be established for it. It may
also refer to the products and services of EISAC. The
CIPRNet DSS will contain data, information, software or
other items coming from external entities. Care has to be
taken to sign appropriate contracts with each of them. E.g.
the input data to the DSS (data registries, pieces of soft-
ware) will come from different sources. Each time a new
data source is planned to be added to the system, the
license conditions for the use of the data need to be
checked with the owner of the data source. Some sets of
data (or software) will be free of charge but, still, an
agreement for using them may be needed. Some other ones
will have to be paid for and the payment might be one-time
or recurring. The licenses might be periodic (even if long-
term) and so the procedures have to be installed in order to
check the validity of a given license and, if needed, to
prolong it.
Some input data coming from external sources may not
be licensed but a permission to use it will have to be
granted. Such copyright issues will have to be checked
when the DSS will use the publications, research results,
data on CI, etc., coming from external bodies. Likewise,
copyright and terms of use of all EISAC materials/products
should be defined and communicated to the users, in case it
should be used by them for their own purposes (e.g. for
research). This approach (of checking the licenses/copy-
rights issues) should be applied for all the items that will
form part of the CIPRNet DSS. This will ensure EISAC
holds the rights to the DSS and its all services.
The names of the products and services should be
carefully chosen and registered. It has to be remembered
that the new EISAC services/products/inventions should be
checked as whether they could be patented.
In case there are consolidated data in the system, e.g. the
licensed one with not-licensed, the data filtration feature
should be provided (filtration by rows and attributes), for
the users not having the license to use a particular data
source (attributes). Different access levels should be
defined in the system, in order to reflect the user privileges
and licenses—some content will be restricted to some
users. This should be followed by providing different
graphical user interfaces (GUI) for those different access
rights.
The end-users will be asked to share their private data,
and so the privacy-related aspects have to be dealt with
when designing, developing and then using the CIPRNet
DSS. The provisions of the EU directive 95/46/EC (Euro-
pean Parliament and Council 1995) have to be respected.
This directive regulates the processing of personal data
within the European Union, specifying the rules for data
collecting, storing and using. The end-users should be
aware of which data they are providing is being stored in
the system and for what purpose. Data should then be used
only for that specific purpose. The system provider should
secure the users’ personal data and should not disclose it
without their consent. The users should be given the
information as to who is collecting their data and they
should have access to their data and be able to modify or
delete it. A privacy policy should be defined for all services
within the DSS and the users should accept it prior to using
the service.
The taxation issues should also be considered (who is
required to pay taxes, in which circumstances etc.)—they
should be regulated by the law in force in the country of
operation of a given provider.
For each service available in the DSS different service
level agreements (SLA) should be established for those
using the service. The SLA should be different for different
client types etc. The payment policies should also be
established—they should be the same for all services. The
terms of use of the services should be specified and they
should probably be the part of the SLA (specifying the
party responsible for wrong decisions etc.).
It is important to have a clear vision of who will be the
owner of the CIPRNet DSS and what will be the respon-
sibilities related to providing the DSS services, which may
be decided on when a legal form for EISAC is agreed on.
The system could be owned by EISAC that would have the
coordinating role as regards the operation of the system.
EISAC local representatives (e.g. in Italy, Germany) would
be responsible for the operation of a given local system—
they would have the system translated into local languages
and they would be providing the services, dealing with data
providers and users, maintaining the system etc. The
questions related to the ownership of the system and the
relations between the EISAC and the local EISAC bodies
should be clearly defined. Specific aspects important in this
regard are: data management, data security, database
maintenance, license procurement, and SLA negotiation.
All legal issues related to the responsibilities of local
EISAC bodies should be decided on in accordance with the
local law regulations.
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One other non-technical issue that has to be taken into
account when planning the CIPRNet DSS is the long-term
customer support. Several issues related to this will have to
be dealt with. Some of them concern the development
phase, e.g. bug-reporting and solving and developing new
features (who will pay for them). Long-term customer
support also embraces issues related to infrastructure—who
will pay for which part of it (hardware and software), how
will the maintenance be dealt with, when should the
hardware and software be replaced and who will cover the
costs etc.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we described the set of services composing
the decision support system for CIP and CIPRNet Virtual
Centre of competence and expertise in CIP.
We also showed our approach in which the services
design was strongly motivated by stakeholders needs and
expectations. Therefore, the proposed services are expected
to improve effectiveness of CIP decision makers.
Particularly, the threat visualization, forecasting, and
consequences analysis services will allow the end-users to
deal with constantly changing information during CI crisis
and to more effectively build the reliable view on crisis
situation. The What-if analysis service will allow users to
examine various crisis scenarios (in order to explore dif-
ferent courses of action) and to learn about results of var-
ious possible decisions. Moreover, the CIPedia and ‘‘Ask
the expert’’ services will constitute the basis for the
CIPRNet project centre of competence and expertise pro-
viding the innovation in the CIP domain.
Concluding, the presented results and our approach will
prepare the basis for the EISAC.
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